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While	 empirical	 and	 phenomenological	 research	 have	 so	 far	 predominated	 in	 legal	
geographical	 work,	 this	 chapter	 shows	 how	 critical	 legal	 analysis	 that	 engages	 with	
geography’s	 conceptual	 core	 can	enrich	both	our	understanding	of	 law	and	 law’s	place	 in	













As	 a	 relatively	 new	 cross-discipline,	 legal	 geography	 lets	 us	 investigate	 legal	 practices,	
provisions	 and	 phenomena	 from	 a	 different	 angle.	 Research	 brings	 in	 landscapes,	 places,	
non-human	 beings,	 objects,	 practices	 and	 concepts,	 rather	 than	 only	 seeing	 law	 as	
relationships	 between	 people.	 The	 approach	 holds	 particular	 promise	 for	 environmental,	
urban,	 constitutional,	 property	 and	 land	 use	 scholars	 interested	 in	 the	 legal	 rules	 and	
practices	which,	 for	example,	 co-produce	wildlife	 reserves,	police	protests	or	help	us	plan	
for	 sustainable	 cities.	 In	 these	 projects,	 lawyers,	 regulators	 and	 administrators	 are	 not	
engaging	 with	 static	 forms	 of	 nature,	 history	 or	 sustainability;	 there	 is	 an	 interaction	
between	 the	 world	 and	 the	 rules.	 Looking	 at	 law	 from	 the	 ground	 up,	 or	 from	within	 a	
network	of	interacting	people,	places	and	things,	brings	a	new	perspective	to	legal	work.	A	




Legal	anthropology,	feminist	 legal	studies,	critical	race	studies,	 indigenous	 law	and	science	
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and	 technology	 studies	 have	 all	 long	 introduced	more	material	 approaches	 to	 investigate	
both	law’s	place	in	the	world	as	well	as	the	world	within	law.	Legal	geography	is	distinctive	





words	 of	 Nigel	 Thrift	 (2003).	 Notoriously	 difficult	 to	 define,	 space	 is	 what	 we	 move	 in,	
through	which	we	connect,	argue,	live	and	work.	Spatiality	is	space’s	effects	indicating	how	
location,	 context	 and	 relationships,	 for	 example,	 impact	 on	 environments,	 people	 and	
activities.	For	many	years	Euclidean	understandings	provided	workable	definitions	for	space	
as	 three-dimensional	 “with	 meters	 or	 miles	 as	 its	 units	 is	 the	 geometric	 system	 that	
adequately	describes	the	structure	of	the	space	of	the	physical	world”	(Sack,	1973,	16).	And	
yet,	 such	 “deterministic,	 and	 one-dimensional	 treatments	 inherited	 from	 the	 'scientific'	
approaches	of	 the	1960s	and	early	1970s”	were	problematic	 for	 geographic	practitioners,	





of	 others	 (Kedar	 et	 al,	 2018).	 The	 effects	 of	 absolute	 conceptions	 of	 space	 continue	
generations	 later,	 telling,	as	 Irene	Watson	writes:	“The	tale	of	 terra	nullius,	 its	capacity	 to	
bury	us	and	its	own	capacity	to	survive	and	go	on	burying	us“	(2002,	253).	Even	municipal	
governance	 practices	 draw	 on	 absolute	 spatial	 conceptions	 of	 borders	 and	 territories,	
implemented	to	govern	people	and	places,	as	Marie-Eve	Sylvestre	et	al	 (2015)	 illustrate	 in	




as	 relationally	 as	 possible,	 as	 a	product	of	 relationships	 rather	 than	as	 a	 container	within	
which	 the	 world	 proceeds.	 In	 Doreen	 Massey’s	 phrase	 that	 has	 so	 captured	 scholars’	
imagination:	space	can	be	understood	as	“the	simultaneities	of	stories	so	far”	(and	places	as	
“collections	 of	 those	 stories,	 articulations	 within	 the	 wider	 power-geometries	 of	 space”	
(2005,	 130)).	 Relational	 understandings	 of	 space,	 “assume	 that	 space	 can	 be	 acted	 upon,	
that	 its	properties	and	descriptions	are	dependent	on	the	distribution	of	mass	and	energy	
and	 that,	 by	 itself,	 space	 therefore	 would	 not	 exert	 physical	 effects”	 (Sack,	 1980,	 55).	
Absolute	and	relational	understandings	of	space	are	not,	however,	a	binary.	Rather,	they	are	
identifiable	 and	 overlapping,	 often	 distinct,	 sometimes	 in	 tension.	 To	 borrow	 from	 actor	
network	 theory,	 this	 enables	 us	 to	 think	 of	 space	 as	 the	 explandum	 rather	 than	 the	





focusing	on	highly	abstracted	 legal	doctrine	alone,	prioritising	as	 it	does	“legally	 relevant“	
rules	and	facts.		
None	of	 this	 is	 to	assume	that	space	or	spatiality	can	be	universally	defined,	as	a	concept	
neatly	bound	and	packaged	up	to	travel.	Spatiality	is	not	like	political	modernity,	which,	as	
Dipesh	 Chakrabarty	 explains,	 “is	 impossible	 to	 think	 of	 anywhere	 in	 the	 world	 without	
invoking	 certain	 categories	 and	 concepts,	 the	 genealogies	 of	 which	 go	 deep	 into	 the	
intellectual	and	even	theological	traditions	of	Europe”	(2009,	4).	Spatiality	–	the	attributes	
of	 space	 –	 travels.	 Spatiality	 will	 depend	 upon	 how	 “space”	 is	 understood	 and	 not	 all	
jurisdictions	 or	 legal	 practices	 use	 space	 as	 an	 object,	 onto	 which	 law	 is	 projected.	
Indigenous	 understandings	 of	 space	 often	 focus	 on	 space	 and	 time	 concurrently.	 Maori	
language,	 for	 example,	 makes	 no	 distinction	 between	 time	 and	 space,	 and	 locations	 are	
both	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 (Tuiwai	 Smith,	 2012,	 52).	 Legal	 geography	 cannot	 assume	 a	
certain	form	of	spatiality	or	automatic	aspatiality.	 John	Borrows’	work	on	Anishinaabe	 law	
reveals	with	 extraordinarily	 clarity	 the	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 specificity	 embodied	 in	 these	
representations	 of	 indigenous	 legal	 knowledge.	 As	 he	 reminds	 us,	 our	 legal	 systems	 are	
dominated	 by	 linguistic	 and	 conceptual	 practices:	 “Some	 traditions,	 like	 those	 of	 the	






push	 for	 an	 apparent	 unilateral	 analytical	 framework	 rather	 than	 inviting	 a	 plurality	 of	
approaches.	 Legal	 geographic	 scholars	 are	 wary	 of	 universalism	 given	 legal	 geography’s	
conceptual	and	methodological	grounding,	with	practitioners	cautious	to	acknowledge	“the	
Imperial	 legacy	 of	Western	 knowledge”	 in	 Linda	 Tuhiwai	 Smith’s	words	 (2012,	 xii).	While	
much	legal	geography	has	so	far	been	both	North/Western	and	critical,	the	shared	aim	is	to	
address	 the	 gap	 between	 legal	 representation	 and	 spatial	 experiences	 wherever	 and	
however	 they	 are	 observed.	 The	 commitment	 to	 better	 spatial	 understanding	 binds	 legal	




So	 far,	 most	 legal	 geographic	 research	 has	 used	 empirical	 and	 phenomenological	
methodologies,	undertaken	in	the	shared	space	of	social	science.	Ethnographic	methods,	for	
instance,	are	highlighted	as	particularly	effective	since	legal	geographers	are	“insiders	of	the	
legal	 world”	 (Braverman,	 2014,	 121),	 enabling	 scholars	 to	 make	 observations	 or	 ask	
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questions	 in	 the	 field	 to	 explore	 administrative	 and	 structural	 intricacies.	 Alternatively,	
ethnographic	methods	can	also	be	kept	separate	within	a	legal	geographic	project.	Michele	
Statz	and	Lisa	Pruitt,	for	example,	allocated	the	interviewing	part	of	the	research	project	to	
Michele	 Statz,	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 she	 had	 “training	 and	 experience	 as	 a	 qualitative	
researcher”	 and	 without	 formal	 legal	 training	 could	 offer	 a	 “forthright	 admission	 of	 not	
having	a	Juris	Doctorate”	to	her	lawyer	interviewees	(2018,	3).		
Many	 legal	 geographers	 use	 mixed	 methods,	 including,	 incorporating	 legal	 analysis	 with	
interviews,	site	visits	and	visual	records.	Nicholas	Blomley	(2005),	used	all	three	methods	in	
his	study	of	urban	gardening,	seeking	 to	explore	how	residents	of	Strathcona,	a	suburb	 in	





related	 to	 the	 properties”	 (2009,	 412).	 Theoretical	 research	 methods,	 probing	 and	
expanding	 our	 understandings	 of	 law	 and	 spatiality	 have	 also	 made	 productive	 and	
important	contributions	to	the	cross-discipline	particularly	in	critiquing	spatial	backdrops	as	
“an	adjectival	context,	a	background	against	which	considerations	of	the	surrounding	space	
are	 thrown	 into	 relief”	 (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,	 2010,	 204,	 see	 also	 Butler	 and	
Mussawir,	2017).		
The	shared	thread	in	all	of	these	methods	is	a	commitment	to	using	geographic	concepts	in	
conjunction	 with	 these	 empirical	 or	 phenomenological	 methods,	 critically	 analyzing	 the	
roles	 of	 both	 law	 and	 space	 in	 societies	 (Freeman,	 2017).	 This	 includes	 established	
geographical	concepts	–	space,	scale,	 territory,	place,	networks,	mobility	–	as	well	as	 legal	
geographic	neologisms	-	“splices”,	“nomospheres”,	“lawscapes”,	chronotopes	-	to	represent	
a	 shared	 understanding	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 legal	 and	 geographical	 thinking	
(Blomley,	 2004,	 Delaney,	 2010,	 Graham	 2010	 and	 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos	 2014,	
Valverde,	 2015).	 These	 shared	 concepts	 underpin	 the	 methodology	 (the	 why)	 chosen	 to	
investigate	 both	 law	 and	 geography,	 justifying	 the	 selection	 of	 individual	 methods	 (the	
how).	One	 reason	 for	 scholarly	diversity	has	undoubtedly	been	 the	 collegial	 resistance	by	
legal	geographic	pioneers	that	either	a	legal	or	geographical	qualification	should	be	a	price	
of	 admission	 to	debates.	 Legal	 geography	 is	open	 to	 scholars	 in	many	disciplines,	 being	a	
qualified	 lawyer	 or	 geography	 is	 not	 a	 prerequisite,	 the	 shared	 focus	 is	 the	 interaction	
(Blomley,	1994).		
Diversity	of	method	is	also	inevitable.	For,	as	geographers	and	legal	geographers	know	well,	
the	 academy	 in	 which	 we	 produce	 our	 research	 inevitably	 affects	 the	 production	 of	
research.	 Achile	 Mbembe	 (2015),	 points	 out	 that	 universities	 are:	 “large	 systems	 of	






is	 not	 all.	 This	 hegemonic	 tradition	 has	 not	 only	 become	 hegemonic.	 It	 also	 actively	
represses	anything	that	actually	is	articulated,	thought	and	envisioned	from	outside	of	these	








This	preference	 for	 contemplation	and	 inclusivity	 rather	 than	 strict	 schema	 is	 increasingly	
widespread	both	 for	scholars	and	for	 institutions	pursuing	 interdisciplinary	research	goals.	




Lin,	 we	 must	 be	 careful	 not	 to	 universalise	 a	 provincial	 insight.	 Calling	 for	 empirical	
versatility	 across	 scholarly	 settings,	 they	 recall	 how	 uncomfortable	 John	 Law	 felt	 when	
speaking	about	STS,	ANT	and	mess	 in	Taiwan,	suddenly	realising	that	“the	need	for	messy	
method	was	 [itself]	 a	 decontextualized	 truth”	 (2017,	 215).	 There	 are	 simply	 no	 universal	
rules.		
3.	Reading	Law	Spatially		
All	 this	 is	 to	 say	 that	 there	 is	 no	 single	 way	 to	 read	 law	 spatially,	 much	 will	 depend	 on	
jurisdiction	 and	 cultural	 legal	 practices.	 Investigating	 both	 spatial	 and	 legal	 practices	
requires	work	on	 the	 interactions	between	both	 law	and	geography	and	 their	disciplinary	
ways	of	understanding	the	world.	Academic	research	and	scholarship	consist	of	knowledge	
practices	with	claims	to	 legitimacy,	validated	 in	different	ways.	Doctrinal	 legal	scholarship,	
the	 bulwark	 of	 legal	 analysis,	 has	 long	 occupied	 a	 disputed	 place	 in	 the	 academy,	 with	
particular	 criticism	of	 exposition,	 setting	out	what	 the	 law	 “is”	 in	 the	 form	of	 treatises	or	
textbooks	 as	 a	 “black	 letter”	 analysis	 (Chynoweth,	 2004;	 Cownie	 2004).	 Of	 course,	 legal	
scholarship	 is	 far	 broader	 than	 this,	 particularly	when	 used	 to	 understand	 society,	 as	 the	
Canadian	 Law	 and	 Society	 Association	 puts	 it,	 to	 understand	 “the	 place	 of	 law	 in	 social,	
political,	economic	and	cultural	life”	(CLSA,	2018)	(and	conversely,	social,	political,	economic	
and	 cultural	 life	 in	 law).	When	 legal	 geography	 scholars	 engage	 in	 reading,	 analysing	 and	
interpreting	law,	they	do	so	to	understand	how	geographic	concepts	appear	(or	not)	in	legal	






legal	 research:	 law	 reform,	expository,	 fundamental	 research,	 and	 legal	 theory.	While	 the	
report	 caused	 some	 professional	 fireworks	 (Backhouse,	 2003),	 Arthurs’	 taxonomy	







(2009,	 22).	 Interrogating	 legal	 categories	 for	 their	 spatial	 effects	 on	 the	 world,	 be	 they	
contracts,	crimes,	property	or	human	rights,	as	well	as	 identifying	the	spatial	assumptions	
these	 categories	 contain,	 perpetuate	 or	 undermine,	 is	 fundamental	 legal	 (geographic)	
scholarship.		
Reading	 law	 spatially	 is	 then	 a	 growing	 strand	 of	 legal	 geography,	 turning,	 in	 Rebecca	
French’s	 words,	 our	 “lens	 on	 basic	 ‘black-letter	 law’	 as	 a	 fieldsite”	 (2009,	 127).	 David	
Delaney	notes	that	“spatial	metaphors	…	are	ubiquitous	in	social	thought	–	and	particularly	
in	 legal	 thought”	 (2010).	 He	 identifies	 lawyers	 and	 judges	 as	 “nomospheric	 technicians”,	
illustrating	 how	 actors	 create	 particular	 world-models	 through	 legal	 moves	 and	 spatial	
imaginaries	whilst	also	 foreclosing	alternative	worlds.	Melinda	Harm	Benson	also	explores	
“the	 idea	 that	 litigation	 is	 itself	 a	 space	 creating	process”	 in	her	work	on	 the	 spatiality	of	
(American)	 rules	 on	 judicial	 review	 (2014,	 215).	 Spatial	 readings	 of	 cases	 and	 legislation	
enable	us	to	use	geographical	concepts	and	techniques	within	legal	analysis	to	understand	
better	 how	 legal	 decisions	 and	 practices	 produce	 and	 are	 produced	 by	 the	 world.	
Disciplinary	 expertise	matters,	 whether	 in	 empirical,	 analytical	 or	 conceptual	 work	 for	 as	
Laura	Nader	has	warned:	“We	have	much	to	learn	from	each	other,	but	if	we	try	to	do	each	
other’s	 work,	 the	 work	 suffers	 from	 our	 naiveté	 and	 inexperience”	 (2002:	 73).	 By	
acknowledging	 disciplinary	 strengths,	 including	 in	 reading	 law,	 we	 can	 expand	 legal	
geography’s	scholarly	and	policy	reach.		
Realist,	feminist	and	critical	race	legal	scholars	have	long	demonstrated	that	legal	practice	is	
replete	with	 choices,	 enrolling	 assumptions	 about	 people	 or	 places	 into	 governance.	 The	
vividly	spatial	metaphor	of	the	doctrine	of	stare	decisis	(“to	stand	by	things	decided”)	is	not	
a	 fixed	and	static	edifice	building	ratio	by	ratio	but	 involves	 judgment	and	discretion.	This	
scope	for	indeterminacy	is	not	always	acknowledged	in	doctrinal	legal	analysis.	Law	students	
still	 learn	 to	 read	 for	 rules	 apparently	 stripped	 of	 their	 worldly	 context,	 the	 ratio	 of	 the	
decision;	even	 if,	as	 feminist	and	critical	 race	scholars	have	 repeatedly	shown,	 this	means	
incorporating	biases	and	prejudice.	Such	a	 focus	on	the	“legally	 relevant”	details	 relies,	as	
Oliver	Wendell	Holmes’	explained	in	his	1897	lecture	to	new	law	students,	on	processes	of	




the	 final	analyses	and	abstract	universals	of	 theoretic	 jurisprudence”	 (Holmes,	1897,	847).	
Students	 today	 are	 still	 routinely	 taught	 how	 to	 perform	 these	 reductions.	 Reading	 law	
spatially	 lets	 us	 read	 for	 presence	 and	 absence,	 for	 spatial	 assumptions,	 metaphors,	
absences	and	biases,	putting	a	geographic	spin	on	Wendell	Holmes’	“facts	of	legal	 import”	
and	 “abstract	 universals	 of	 theoretic	 jurisprudence”	 to	 see	 “facts	 of	 spatial	 import”	 and	
“situated	applications	of	theoretic	jurisprudence”.	
Reading	 cases	 and	 legislation	 spatially,	 looking	 for	 spatial	 assumptions	 and	 biases	 or	
evidence	of	abstraction,	 lets	us	draw	on	 the	orthodox	 legal	 technique	of	asking	questions	
but	 ask	 different	 ones	 instead.	 The	 formal	 legal	 ratio	 will	 still	 matter	 but	 for	 legal	








legal	 technique	 (asking	 questions	 to	 interrogate	 judgment)	 to	 understand	 the	 decision’s	





woman’s	 shoulders,	 reaching	 for	 a	 volume	 of	 Law	 Reports.	 Legal	 geographers	 also	 have	
significant	 intellectual	 debts.	 Observing	 feminist	 scholars	 “ask	 the	 woman	 question”	
(Bartlett,	 2012,	 405;	 Baer,	 2009),	 or	 critical	 race	 scholars	 asking	 how	 “[u]nacknowledged	
White	privilege	helps	maintain	racism’s	stories”	(Solórzano	and	Yosso	2002,	27),	empowers	
legal	geographers	to	ask	spatial	questions,	questioning	whether	law	is	anti-geography,	and,	
if	 so,	 why	 or	 how	 and	 what	 consequences	 this	 brings.	 Feminist	 legal	 scholars	 challenge	
gender	bias	 in	 legal	doctrine	and	 judicial	 reasoning,	explicitly	 seeking	 to	 remedy	 injustices	
and	to	improve	the	conditions	of	women’s	lives	particularly	by	focusing	on	particularity	and	
context,	 giving	 voice	 to	 women	 who	 have	 been	 silenced	 or	 side-lined	 (Conaghan,	 2013).	
Legal	 geographers	 can	 challenge	 law’s	 biases,	 particularly	 in	 property,	 administrative	 or	
international	 law,	 excavating	 assumptions	 about	 place,	 networks,	 boundaries,	 spatialities	
and	practices,	which	are	doing	legal	work.	
This	 raises	 the	 question:	 are	 all	 legal	 decisions,	 practices	 and	 legalities	 spatial?	 For	 legal	
geographers	the	answer	is,	yes.	Scholars	can	read	any	decision	or	legal	provision	spatially	so	
that	even	when	spatial	characteristics	are	not	 immediately	obvious,	 legal	geographers	can	
find	 them.	 The	 foundational	 Scottish	 1932	 case	 of	 Donoghue	 v	 Stevenson,	 for	 instance,	
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concerns	 the	 finding	 of	 a	 snail	 in	 a	 bottle	 of	 ginger	 beer,	 a	 cloudy	 drink	 with	 natural	
sedimentation	 poured	 into	 bottles	 that	 were	 “washed	 and	 allowed	 to	 stand	 in	 places	 to	





movement	of	 the	 snails,	 the	 lack	of	physical	boundaries	 (bottle	 caps	were	not	put	on	 the	
bottles	until	after	they	were	filled)	and	the	network	of	manufacture	(including	the	label	with	
the	manufacturer’s	name	and	address,	enabling	the	pursuer	to	identify	the	respondent	and	





And	so,	one	 reason	 to	 read	cases	 spatially	 is	 to	 read	 for	assumptions	and	biases,	perhaps	
understood	 in	 geography	 but	 not	 interrogated	 in	 law.	 In	 Michele	 Statz	 and	 Lisa	 Pruitt’s	
analysis	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	 word	 “distance”	 in	 American	 abortion	 law,	 for	 example,	 they	
found	that	while	the	judges	might	find	quantitative	assessments	relatively	easy	to	relate	to	
(driving	 for	 550	miles	 to	 the	 nearest	 Texas	 clinic,	 for	 instance),	 this	 “doesn’t	 require	 too	
much	of	a	mental	leap	to	realize	how	difficult	that	is.”	And	yet,	if	immigration,	childcare	or	
work	commitments	are	factored	in,	“it	only	tells	a	small	piece	of	the	story,	that’s	for	sure...	
You	 know,	 it	 could	 still	 be	 difficult	 if	 it’s	 30	miles”	 (2017,	 13).	 Distance,	 Statz	 and	 Pruitt	




than	 subjective,	 embedded	 understandings	 of	 the	 concept.	 This	 matters	 enormously	 to	
women	 on	 the	 ground	 dependent	 on	 activist	 lawyers	 to	 protect	 abortion	 rights,	 knowing	
which	spatial	tactic	to	pick.		
A	 second	 reason	 to	 read	 law	 spatially	 is	 to	 identify	 any	 spatial	 imaginaries	 invoked	 or	
implied.	Decisions	with	effects	for	types	of	place,	are	often	built	on	distinctive	spatial	visions	
that	may	sometimes	be	quite	explicitly	articulated.	Nicholas	Blomley,	for	instance,	has	noted	
how	 a	 prevailing	 legal	 and	 liberal	 imaginary	 of	 bounded	 selves	 underpins	 a	 critique	 of	
begging	 for	 crossing	 prevailing	 cultural	 and	 normative	 boundaries	 between	 people.	 This	
imaginary	 of	 self	 underpins	 an	 understanding	 of	 spaces	 for	 encounters	 with	 difference	
(including	pavements	or	sidewalks)	as	threats	to	autonomy	and	liberty	rather	than	as	spaces	
of	interaction.	If	the	social	imaginary	of	self	can	be	changed,	then	the	spatial	imaginary	of	a	
“safe”	 street,	 public	 space	 and	 pan-handling	 can	 also	 change	 (Blomley,	 2010).	 Similarly,	
fearful	spatial	imaginaries	can	also	do	governance	work,	as	Mariana	Valverde	explains	in	her	




be	 due	 to	 an	 unconscious	 fear	 of	 a	 descent	 into	 ’Third	World‘	 urban	 chaos	 …	 the	 ’Third	
World	 city‘	 specter	 …	 looms	 large	 in	 the	 ‘regulatory	 imagination‘	 as	 a	 possibility	 to	 be	
avoided	in	Toronto”	(Valverde,	2012,	144).	This	particular	imaginary	was	to	be	avoided.	
A	third	advantage	of	reading	law	spatially	is	that	cases	can	illustrate	the	difficulties	of	fitting	
in.	 This	 is	 a	 well-established	 concern	 in	 critical	 race	 studies.	 Patricia	 Hill	 Collins	 has	
highlighted	how:	“Oppressed	groups	are	frequently	placed	in	the	situation	of	being	listened	
to	 only	 if	 we	 frame	 our	 ideas	 in	 the	 language	 that	 is	 familiar	 to	 and	 comfortable	 for	 a	
dominant	 group”	 (2002,	 vii).	We	 are	 in	 the	 earliest	 days	 of	 academic	 understanding	 how	
race	and	legal	geography	explicitly	interact,	but	it	is	evident	that	particularly	in	Northern	and	
Western	jurisdictions	spatial	concepts	may	not	necessarily	“fit	in”	to	existing	legal	discourse	
and	 practice	 producing	 systematic	 repression	 and	 discrimination.	 In	 Subversive	 Property,	
Sarah	 Keenan	 (2014)	 has	 explained	 how	 Australian	 property	 practices	 imposed	 leasehold	
arrangements	onto	aboriginal	ways	of	living	and	cultural	practices,	requiring	communities	to	
fit	 in	with	the	 leases’	conceptual	grids	rather	than	the	other	way	around.	Sherene	Razack,	
meanwhile,	 has	 demonstrated	how	 the	 litigation	 following	 the	 rape	 and	 killing	 of	 Pamela	
George	 in	 1995	 attached	 a	 space	 of	 violence	 to	 her	 wherever	 she	 went:	 “While	 Pamela	
George	remained	stuck	in	the	racial	space	of	prostitution	where	violence	is	innate,	the	men	
were	 considered	 to	 be	 far	 removed	 from	 the	 spaces	 of	 violence”.	 For	 Pamela	 George,	
wherever	 she	 went,	 the	 “implicit	 spatial	 underpinning”	 went	 with	 her:	 “She	 was	 of	 the	
space	 where	 murders	 happen;	 [her	 attackers]	 were	 not”	 (Razack,	 2010,	 126).	 Pamela	
George	had	to	fit	into	her	allocated	space,	the	men	into	theirs.	And	if	spatial	ontologies	do	
not	fit,	results	can	be	violently	or	legally	imposed,	with	an	end	result	that	produces	victory	
for	 one	worldview	over	 another	 (Watson,	 2014).	 Reading	 cases	 for	 spatial	 fit	 can	 identify	
when	such	spatial	mismatches	occur	and	the	work	they	are	doing	in	legal	decision-making.		
A	 fourth	 reason	 for	 reading	 law	 spatially	 is	 profoundly	 practical.	 Reading	 cases	 to	 glean	
geographic	 details	 about	 the	 setting	 or	 event	 provides	 a	 basis	 from	 which	 to	 ask	 future	
questions	 (both	 conceptual	 or	 practical).	 Indigenous	 legal	 scholar	 Val	 Napoleon	 (2016)	
reminds	us	that	“Law	is	an	intellectual	process,	not	a	thing,	and	it	is	something	that	people	
actually	 do.”	 This	 is	 a	 particularly	 important	 lesson	 within	 legal	 geography,	 with	 its	
commitment	to	the	world,	particularly	if	we	take	on	board	Aja	Y.	Martinez’s	(2014)	caution	
that	 academia	 prefers	 “the	 strength	 of	 logos”	 to	 pathos	 in	 academic	 exchanges.	 Reading	




By	way	 of	 illustration,	 let	 us	 read	 the	 1999	 decision	 by	 the	 House	 of	 Lords,	DPP	 v	 Jones	
([1999]	 2	 AC	 240),	 spatially.	DPP	 v	 Jones	 is	 hugely	 significant	 for	 English	 highways	 law,	 a	
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category	of	place	where	it	 is	still	possible	(largely	thanks	to	this	 judgment)	to	act	 in	public	
regardless	of	whether	the	land	itself	is	publicly	or	privately	owned.	The	facts	were	that	on	1	
June	 1995,	 at	 about	 6.40	 p.m.	 21	 protestors	 held	 banners	 saying:	 "Never	 Again",	
"Stonehenge	 Campaign	 10	 years	 of	 Criminal	 Injustice",	 and	 "Free	 Stonehenge."	 The	
policeman	asked	the	protestors	to	move	off	the	verge	and	while	many	did,	the	litigants,	Mr.	
Lloyd	 and	 Dr.	 Jones,	 did	 not.	 Arrested	 and	 convicted	 for	 taking	 part	 in	 a	 "trespassory	
assembly",	 they	eventually	appeared	before	the	House	of	Lords,	 then	the	highest	court	 in	
the	 UK.	 The	 court	 held,	 by	 majority,	 that	 an	 assembly	 of	 this	 type	 would	 not	 be	 an	
unreasonable	 use	 of	 the	 highway	 (Lords	 Irvine,	 Hutton	 and	 Clyde),	 rejecting	 the	minority	
view	 that	 only	 activities	 incidental	 to	 passing	 and	 re-passing	 would	 be	 acceptable	 (Lords	






Rather	 than	 beginning	 with	 questions	 of	 highway	 obstruction,	 Lord	 Irvine,	 the	 then	 Lord	
Chancellor,	began	with	a	bold	 legal,	 and	spatial,	move,	 challenging	 spatial	 fit.	His	opening	
paragraph	 began:	 “My	 Lords,	 this	 appeal	 raises	 an	 issue	 of	 fundamental	 constitutional	
importance:	 what	 are	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 public's	 rights	 of	 access	 to	 the	 public	 highway?”	
([1999]	 2	 AC	 240,	 251).	 He	 held	 that	 understandings	 of	 highways	 had	 to	 mesh	 with	
constitutional	 law,	 particularly	 given	 the	 incoming	 Human	 Rights	 Act	 1998	 and	 its	 direct	
implementation	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	Human	 Rights.	 This	 technique	 of	making	
the	site	fit	the	law	rather	than	applying	the	law	to	the	site	is	all	too	common,	as	Sandy	Kedar	
et	 al’s	 book	 Empty	 Lands,	 illustrates,	 analysing	 the	 litigation	 brought	 by	 Bedouin	 people	
displaced	from	parts	of	the	Negev	Desert.	Here,	as	Kedar	et	al	show,	a	particular	–	limited,	
contemporary	and	rather	absolute	–	specification	of	how	to	define	a	village	or	settlement	
produces	 assessments	 about	 land	 ownership	 claims	 that	 are	 apparently	 legally	 quite	
straightforward.	 Adopting	 a	 modern	 “law	 first”	 approach	 and	 assessing	 historical	 use	
patterns	against	current	legal	and	geographic	definitions,	misses	the	detail	and	specificity	of	
how	Bedouin	people	 in	 the	nineteenth	century	moved	and	 farmed,	a	way	of	 life	 that	was	
(and	 still	 can	 be)	 dynamic	 and	 relational,	 not	 easily	 fixed	 by	 coordinates	 or	 conceptual	
boundaries.	 The	 test	 for	 ownership,	 however,	 had	 to	 fit	more	 bounded	 spatial	 and	 legal	
norms.	
Spatial	 assumptions	 are	 clearly	 evident	 in	 DPP	 v	 Jones.	 As	 Nicholas	 Blomley	 (2010)	




was	only	 Lord	Hope,	dissenting,	who	was	concerned	with	 the	 rights	of	 landowners	 in	 this	
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context,	 seeing	 the	highway	 in	 terms	of	property,	 involving	 access	by	 the	public	 “to	 their	
land”.	 The	 spatial	 assumption	 that	 highways	 are	 property	 belonging	 to	 an	 owner	 was	
otherwise	noticeable	by	its	absence	since	the	remaining	judges	preferred	to	see	highways	as	
a	spatial	category	largely	unaffected	by	ownership.	This	work	done	by	spatial	categories	and	
assumptions	 here	 echoes	 the	 analysis	 by	 Sarah	 Keenan	 in	 her	 (2014)	 study	 of	 migrant	
workers,	 where	 an	 absolute	 conception	 of	 space	 with	 hard	 borders	 creates	 a	 binary	
between	 citizens	 and	 non-citizens,	 underplaying	 the	 plural	 and	 dynamic	 relationships	
migrant	 workers	 create	 between	 global	 communities	 and	 networks.	 Legal	 geography	
surfaces	 these	 assumptions,	 identifying	 biases	 even	 if	 they	 are	 remarkably	 mundane	
(highways	are	for	mobility,	 they	are	not	envisaged	as	property)	 illustrating	the	work	these	
spatial	moves	are	doing	in	apparently	abstract	legal	reasoning	(see	also	Delaney,	2010).		











solely	 for	activities	 incidental	 to	passing	and	re-passing.	 In	contrast,	Lord	Clyde	dissenting,	
presented	a	much	narrower	spatial	(&	explicitly	Christian)	imaginary,	allowing	for	the	singing	
of	hymns	or	Christmas	carols,	looking	in	shop	windows,	queuing	to	enter	the	shop	or	using	
the	 highway	 for	 a	 moving	 procession.	 These	 imaginaries	 underpin	 both	 spatial	 and	 legal	





and	globally,	once	 the	key	material,	economic,	 cultural	and	 legal	assumptions	are	worked	
out.	
Lastly,	reading	the	case	spatially	provides	the	spatial	and	temporal	insights	that	emerged	in	









protest”)	 and	no	 camping,	 a	 temporal	 limitation	 that	proved	decisive	 in	 the	2012	Occupy	
litigation	(Layard,	2016).		
5.	Conclusion:	Imaginative	leaps	
Reading	 cases	 spatially	 requires	 a	 leap	 of	 imagination	 analogous	 to	 that	 in	 the	 Feminist	
Judgment	 Projects	 where	 “the	 imaginative	 gap	 between	 the	 legal	 establishment	 and	





be	 unmade”	 (2014,	 2322).	 Extending	 our	 vision	 and	 lifting	 our	 eyes	 as	 legal	 geography	
exhorts	 us	 to	 do,	 enables	 us	 to	 draw	 on	 imaginations	 whether	 sociological	 (Mills	 2000;	
Taylor	 2004)	 or	 geographical	 (Harvey	 1990,	 Gregory	 1994)	 to	 look	 up	 from	 the	 familiar	
routines	of	daily	life,	including	the	familiar	routines	of	reading	law.		
Once	 imaginations	 are	 invoked,	we	 can	 explore	 alternative	 spatial	 imaginaries,	 borrowing	
insights	from	critical	race	studies	that	rhetoric,	composition	and	narrative	are	all	productive	
“tools	 by	 which	 to	 interrogate	 the	 effects	 of	 racial	 bias”	 to	 develop	 “counterstories”	
(Martinez,	2014,	36).	Alternative	tellings	or	representations	enables	marginalised	people	(or	
perspectives)	to	challenges	“master	narratives”	(Yosso,	2006,	p.	10).	Shifting	perspective	–	
using	 composition	 or	 narrative	 -	 enables	 “voices	 from	 the	margins	 become	 the	 voices	 of	
authority”	in	researching	experiences	(Solórzano	&	Delgado	Bernal,	2001,	p.	314).	Similarly,	
the	 shared	 intellectual	 threads	 with	Wild	 Law	 scholars	 centring	 the	 earth	 in	 scholarship,	
teaches	 how	–	 practically	 –	 to	 change	 perspective	 (Maloney	 and	 Rogers,	 2017).	Once	we	
understand	 and	 expose	 the	 spatial	 assumptions,	 imaginaries	 and	 presumed	 “fit”	 that	 are	
being	presented	as	ostensibly	neutral,	abstract	ratios,	we	can	demonstrate	how	alternative	
imaginaries	might	 lead	us	 to	different	 legal	 results	 that	 acknowledge	 spatiality,	 producing	
more	 geographically-sensitive	 and	 representative	 legal	 rules	 and	 practices.	 Most	 of	 all,	
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